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THE ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS:
REFRAMING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Michael J. Burstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
I begin with two stories about intellectual property and entrepreneurship. The
first takes place at the birth of modern communications. Alexander Graham Bell is
credited most frequently with the invention of the telephone.1 At the very least, he
was the pioneering force behind its commercialization and widespread adoption. But
he faced a significant enemy in Western Union, the nation’s leading telegraph
company, whose business model was threatened fundamentally by voice
communication over wire. The Bell Company “was little more than a typically
hopeless start-up,” 2 while Western Union “brought overwhelming advantages:
capital, an existing nationwide network of wires, and a close relationship with
newspapers, hotels, and politicians.” 3 Western Union entered the market for
telephone service with significant force, hoping to consign the fledging Bell
Company to niche status or force them to sell. 4 Bell fought back with the only
weapon in its arsenal: a patent on the critical technology. Bell filed an infringement
suit against Western Union in 1878, leading to one of the most significant patent
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1
This statement is the subject of great debate and much historical scholarship. There
were several parties working on telephone technology at roughly the same time. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 720–22 (2012)
(summarizing competing claims of inventorship). Although Bell prevailed as a legal matter
with respect to the most important patent to cover the technology, other inventors have just
as good if not better claims to be the actual inventors of the telephone. See CHRISTOPHER
BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE PATENT THAT
CHANGED AMERICA 3–5 (2015).
2
TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 17
(2010). The company that bore Bell’s name eventually came to be a government-sanctioned
monopoly itself, and was the sole provider of telephone service nationwide until its breakup
in 1984. Id. at 17.
3
Id. at 26.
4
See id. at 25–27.
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cases of the era.5 Bell emerged victorious, with his patent valid and infringed, and a
settlement that kept Western Union out of the telephone business.6
The second story takes place over one hundred years later, as that same
technology neared its demise. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, internet technology
had become sufficiently well-developed that it posed a disruptive threat to providers
of traditional telephone services. Companies like Vonage offered consumers lowpriced telephone service that utilized the packet-switched internet to transmit calls
to and from traditional phone lines, rather than relying solely upon the wireline
incumbent phone companies. 7 This situation mirrored the start of the telephone
industry, but with the places reversed. The descendants of the Bell Company were
the monopolists, and Vonage was the startup that threatened to undermine their core
business model with new technology. And there was another crucial difference: this
time, the important patents were in the hands of the incumbents, who deployed them
in litigation against the startup. 8 Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T each extracted
settlements from Vonage totaling around $200 million, “which was about one
quarter of Vonage’s annual revenue at the time.”9 As a result, “Vonage’s marketing
expenditures decreased, and its subscriber growth slowed substantially. Indeed,
Vonage was almost delisted from the New York Stock Exchange, and some
observers predicted bankruptcy.”10
These two stories may prompt opposite conclusions about the relationship
between patents and entrepreneurship. The first story demonstrates, as Tim Wu puts
it, that “in the hands of an outside inventor, a patent serves . . . as [a] sort of corporate
shield that can prevent a large industrial power from killing you off or seizing control
of your company and the industry.” In this view, patents help “sow the seeds of
creative destruction.”11 The second story, on the other hand, is, in Ted Sichelman’s
words, one of “patent bullies,” who “assert their patents against entrants to prevent
innovative, disruptive technologies from competing with the bullies’ outmoded
products,”12 and thereby stifle rather than promote innovation.
It is easy to draw from these competing stories the conclusion that the
relationship between patents and entrepreneurship simply depends on context. It
depends on the relative competitive positioning of startups and incumbents; on the
nature of the technology that the startup is seeking to commercialize; on the structure
5

See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 54–56.
See WU, supra note 2, at 30–31. To be fair, the settlement was possible not only
because of Bell’s success in litigation, including in the Supreme Court of the United States,
but also because of intervening business events. See id.
7
See Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543, 554–56 (2014) (describing the founding and early history of
Vonage).
8
See id. at 551–52 (discussing the patent lawsuit brought by Sprint, Verizon, and
AT&T against Vonage).
9
Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
10
Id.
11
WU, supra note 2, at 30.
12
Sichelman, supra note 7, at 549–50.
6

2016]

ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS

613

and function of the entrepreneurial community, including other companies and
sources of financing, of which the startup is part. But “it depends” is hardly a
satisfying explanation of the relationship between IP and entrepreneurship; the
question “on what?” follows naturally and inevitably.
The existing literature on patenting and entrepreneurship13 that tries to answer
that question incorporates two assumptions. First, it takes the existing arrangement
of patent rights and institutions as a given and asks how that arrangement affects
startup companies. Second, it sees startups as atomistic, individual enterprises. To
be sure, this literature has produced interesting and useful results that have helped
advance our understanding of the ways in which startups respond to and interact
with the current patent laws. But it is unlikely to provide a satisfactory explanation,
to take one example, for the divergent experiences of Bell and his latter-day internetbased successors. To fully explain why patents seem to work differently in different
settings, we need a more systematic understanding of the roles that IP plays within
and among entrepreneurs, startup companies, sources of funding, and the larger
business and innovation ecosystems of which they are a part. And to interrogate
whether our current IP laws are working in a way that best promotes and facilitates
entrepreneurship and capital formation, we need to think of intellectual property
laws not as a set of external constraints, but rather as endogenous tools for
accomplishing particular goals.
This Article therefore offers a different conceptual and methodological
framework for investigating the links between intellectual property and
entrepreneurship. Rather than starting with the existing IP regime as a baseline and
asking how entrepreneurial ventures behave with respect to that regime, this Article
proposes starting with entrepreneurial activity and identifying how and why
intellectual property might play a supporting role. My account of entrepreneurship
places the generation and sharing of information at its center.14 It posits that ideas
and their implementation are the primary source of value for entrepreneurs. 15
Entrepreneurship in this view is the process by which individuals and firms generate,
produce, and disseminate innovations in business and technology.16 Entrepreneurs
begin with an idea, they secure funding to develop that idea, and they figure out how
to commercialize the idea and build a business from it. These intertwined processes
all take place in an environment in which entrepreneurs do not act alone. They

13

Of course, other forms of intellectual property are deeply important to the
entrepreneurial process. Copyright looms large in the creative industries, and all firms rely
upon trademarks as critical components of their branding strategies. Nevertheless, this
Article focuses on patents and technology-based startups.
14
A note on terminology: This Article uses the word “sharing” not in an altruistic sense,
but in the sense of exchange.
15
See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial
Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1535 (2013) (“We adopt the widely held view that
entrepreneurial opportunities are ideas created by entrepreneurs, rather than resources
waiting to be discovered.”).
16
See infra Part III.C.
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interact all of the time with funders, business partners, and competitors, often,
though not always, in geographically distinct clusters.17
To study systematically these intertwined processes, I borrow from the
literature on governance of knowledge commons. A knowledge commons is a form
of “institutionalized community governance of the sharing and . . . creation of
knowledge, data, and other types of intellectual and cultural resources.” 18 Some
well-understood examples of knowledge commons include patent pools, opensource software projects, and Wikipedia. 19 These arrangements share several
common (no pun intended) characteristics. Each involves the coordinated sharing of
critical information resources. Each has institutionalized mechanisms for governing
that sharing. And each relies on a mix of formal and informal rules and norms—
including, sometimes and in complex ways, intellectual property—to support those
mechanisms.
Borrowing and adapting concepts and methodologies from Elinor Ostrom’s
pioneering studies of natural resource commons, 20 the knowledge commons
framework makes two contributions to our understanding of the role of intellectual
property in information production. First, as a substantive matter, it focuses the
analysis of information production and dissemination on context and complexity.
Second, as a methodological matter, it focuses on deep analysis of case studies to
shed light on that context and complexity in intellectual and cultural production.
The bulk of this Article further adapts the knowledge commons framework to
the study of entrepreneurship. I offer three key activities that entrepreneurs and their
associated firms engage in—product development, competitive positioning, and
fundraising—as examples of knowledge commons within the entrepreneurial
ecosystem. 21 In each of these activities, there is a distinct, but sometimes
overlapping set of actors. The relationships among those actors with respect to the
production of new innovations all require some exchange or use of valuable
information. Tracing the rules and practices that govern that use and exchange

17

See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 2–3 (1994).
18
Brett M. Frischmann et al., Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 3 (Brett M. Frischmann et al., eds., 2014).
19
Brett M. Frischmann, Two Enduring Lessons from Elinor Ostrom, 9 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 387, 402 (2013).
20
See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1–2 (1990) (describing the problems associated with
governing and managing natural resource systems).
21
These three business functions are meant as examples and not a comprehensive list
of the entrepreneurial activities that might be modeled as knowledge commons. Other such
activities might include marketing, pricing, manufacturing, quality control, and so forth. My
argument here is limited to “proof of concept”—I use these three examples to demonstrate
the analytic power of the knowledge commons framework applied to entrepreneurship, but
not to explore its reach.
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should yield valuable insights into the roles that intellectual property might play in
the entrepreneurship process.22
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the existing literature on IP
and entrepreneurship to demonstrate the existence of significant gaps in our
understanding of that relationship. Part III then articulates a framework for
systematic analysis of those gaps. It explains that commons governance is a part of
numerous entrepreneurial activities, and focuses attention on two aspects of
entrepreneurship that are mostly overlooked in the legal literature: information
exchange and collaboration. Part IV concludes with some notes on methodology and
proposals for further research.
II. EXISTING STUDIES OF PATENTING AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Most existing studies of the relationship between intellectual property and
entrepreneurship focus on the effects of various IP laws on entrepreneurial behavior.
They focus, in other words, on how startups utilize and encounter the existing
arrangement of IP laws. To be sure, this approach offers some valuable insights, but
it does not provide a complete picture of the ways in which intellectual property and
entrepreneurship interact.
One line of inquiry asks why entrepreneurs choose to patent (or not to patent)
their inventions. The classic economic justification for patents is that they offer an
ex ante incentive to invent by providing the exclusivity needed for inventors to
recoup their investments in otherwise freely appropriable research and
development.23 But the evidence that the prospect of a patent encourages invention
that would not otherwise have been undertaken is notoriously weak, among both
startups24 and established companies.25 The facts that “the average expected value

22

The “commons” terminology and methodology has not previously been applied to
the study of entrepreneurship in the legal literature. Management scholars, on the other hand,
have started to use the framework. See, e.g., Sonali K. Shah & Cyrus C.M. Mody, Creating
a Context for Entrepreneurship: Examining How Users’ Technological and Organizational
Innovations Set the Stage for Entrepreneurial Activity, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE
COMMONS 313, 313 (Brett M. Frischmann et al. eds., 2014).
23
See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1476–78 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007).
24
See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1283–
87 (2009). To be fair, this finding is somewhat industry specific, as discussed in more detail
below. See id. at 1286; infra text accompanying notes 35–38.
25
See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 795 (1987) (“Firms may
sometimes refrain from patenting processes to avoid disclosing either the fact or the details
of an innovation.”); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 2–3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/
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of a patent is extremely small . . . [,] the overwhelming majority of patents have no
value whatsoever, and of those that have value, it is nearly impossible to determine
ex ante,”26 give rise to what some call a “patent paradox”:27 if patents provide little
incentive, why do companies patent? A range of answers has been offered: patents
may be useful for maintaining super-competitive prices, as means for specializing
across the innovation value chain and generating licensing revenues, developing an
arsenal for cross-licensing, securing investment and financing, as assets in
bankruptcy, as means to block others from patenting or to block others from
effectively using their own patented technology, and for public relations or
improving a firm’s image.28
The most comprehensive recent effort to examine empirically the relationship
between IP and entrepreneurship is the Berkeley Patent Survey. 29 That study
surveyed 1,332 early-stage technology companies on a range of issues related to
patenting and entrepreneurship.30 It found that startup companies patent for a wide
variety of reasons and that there is much nuance and context-specificity in those
reasons.31 Most basically, for example, it found that patent holdings among startup
companies vary by industry, with biotechnology and medical device companies
much more likely to hold patents and to hold more of them than software or internet
firms.32 This industry differentiation held true across the range of findings in the
study.33
With respect to the reasons why startups patent, the study found that preventing
others from copying one’s invention is the primary driver of startup patenting.34 But
firms use multiple appropriation strategies to realize value from their investments in
research and development (“R&D”), 35 and the extent to which patents are an
important part of those strategies varies with both the industry and the specific
technology at issue. For example, biotech companies collectively ranked patenting

w7552.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6Y6-P2JY] (discussing prevalence of patents and other
appropriation mechanisms among manufacturers).
26
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
5 (2005).
27
Id.
28
For a comprehensive review, see Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do
Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1071–82 (2008).
29
See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1255; see also Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H.
Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 111 (2010).
30
Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1255.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1278–79.
33
Id. at 1278–83.
34
See id. at 1297; see also Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 153.
35
See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1289–90 & fig.1; see also David J. Teece,
Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287 (1986) (discussing the costs and
benefits of first-mover advantage and ownership of complementary assets).

2016]

ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS

617

as their most important appropriation strategy; 36 IT hardware firms and medical
device startups ranked patenting second behind first-mover advantage; 37 and
venture-backed IT hardware firms ranked patenting as important as secrecy in
capturing the returns from R&D. 38 These appropriability strategies also can vary
with the type of innovation at issue. The study found that “patenting is almost twice
as important for product innovators than for process innovators.”39
Patents also may be thought to play a role in product development, particularly
for startups that lack the capital to scale up their technological developments for
manufacturing and commercialization. In theory, patenting might help to enable the
exchange of technological information without fear of appropriation before
payment.40 A literature on “markets for technology” takes this view, and emphasizes
the importance of a patent to the broader process of information exchange that
accompanies research and development partnerships.41 A corollary is that patenting
facilitates the development of specialized business models based on licensing out
technologies.42 Survey data suggests that this view too is complicated. The startups
surveyed in the Berkeley Patent Survey, for example, collectively ranked
“obtain[ing] licensing revenues” as one of the least important reasons for securing a
patent, which “might seem to conflict with the markets-for-technology view that
small firms are more likely to license their patents because vertical specialization
allows these firms to operate in upstream technology markets and provide
technology inputs to (generally large) firms operating in downstream product
markets.”43 At the same time, however, the authors find support for “the view that
the smallest of startup firms rely more on patenting for licensing than larger firms,”44
and that biotechnology firms generally place a greater emphasis on licensing than
firms in other industries.45 But even the biotech story is more complicated. Although
36

See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1290–91.
See id. at 1291. “First mover advantage” allows firms to reap super-competitive
returns on their investments in R&D during the time that they have the market to themselves
before competitive imitation. See, e.g., Teece, supra note 35, at 287.
38
See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1292.
39
Id. at 1293.
40
This is known in the literature as the disclosure paradox. See Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (Nat’l
Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research & Comm. on Econ. Growth of the Soc. Sci. Research
Council eds., 1962). Consistent with the argument advanced in this Article, in previous work
I argued that intellectual property is not the necessary or sole mechanism for solving this
paradox. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91
TEX. L. REV. 227, 228 (2012).
41
See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF
INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 1 (2001).
42
See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property
Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 452 (2004).
43
Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1301–02.
44
Id. at 1302.
45
Id. at 1303; Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 164.
37
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it is “well-documented that . . . biotechnology startups typically form alliances with
incumbents to clear costly regulatory hurdles and bring their innovations to
market,”46 biotech firms cited a reluctance to disclose the information necessary to
secure a patent as their primary reason for forgoing patent protection.47
Finally, patents appear to play a role in securing entrepreneurial financing, but
the existing evidence sheds little light on the nature of that role. There is a fair
amount of evidence that different sources of entrepreneurial finance—most notably
venture capital, but also sources of debt financing—find patents valuable in making
their investment decisions. Three-quarters of venture-backed respondents in the
Berkeley Patent Survey reported that a potential funding source with whom they
negotiated “indicated that having patents was important to their funding decision.”48
This finding is consistent with econometric studies that have shown that more
intensive patenting by startups in the software and biotechnology sectors is
associated with greater total investment and number of financing rounds,49 and with
recent work drawing a similar correlation between patents and venture lending.50
But although the correlation appears clear, causation is much murkier. One
suggestion is that patents serve as signals to financing sources, either of the quality
of the underlying technology or of the management team and its strategic
positioning.51 Alternatively, patents may help startups secure freedom to operate,
thereby making their business models more attractive to investors;52 or they could
serve as assets in bankruptcy53 or as collateral.54 Survey data generally cannot sort
out these competing explanations. 55 While some qualitative work suggests that
patents are unlikely to be the driving force behind financing in the software
industry,56 more systematic investigation is needed.
A distinct line of inquiry asks how startups encounter the patent system other
than through their own patenting activities. How, in other words, does the patent
system affect startups more broadly? One point of contact separate and apart from a
firm’s own patenting is its licensing of others’ patents. Licensing generally can be
46

Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 164.
See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1313.
48
Id. at 1307.
49
For an overview of this literature, see Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 122–
23 & nn.54–56.
50
See Yael V. Hochberg et al., Patent Collateral, Investor Commitment, and the Market
for Venture Lending 1, 9–11 (Aug. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econ.
upf.edu/~cserrano/papers/HSZ_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGD5-74PK].
51
See, e.g., David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Resources As Dual Sources of
Advantage: Implications for Valuing Entrepreneurial-Firm Patents, 34 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 761, 761–62 (2013); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002).
52
See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1306.
53
See id. at 1306–07.
54
See Hochberg et al., supra note 50, at 2–4.
55
See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1307.
56
See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEX. L. REV. 961, 963–68 (2005).
47
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ex ante, that is, “before the purchaser has obtained the technology through other
means,”57 or ex post, in which the license is executed “after a firm has invested in
creating, developing or commercializing the patented technology.”58 The former are
generally associated with technology transfer—the exchange of useful technological
information mediated in some cases by the exchange of a patent embodying at least
part of that information.59 The latter has come to be associated with the behavior of
patent assertion entities (or “patent trolls”) whose business models depend solely on
licensing patents, but it more properly refers to enforcement activities by any patentholding entity.60 Putting aside a vigorous debate in the academic literature about
whether ex post licensing activity is socially valuable, these two types of licensing
present quite different opportunities and challenges for startup companies.
Existing studies have focused on determining which mode of licensing is more
common. The Berkeley Patent Survey found evidence of both kinds of activity, with
some significant industry differentiation—biotechnology firms appear more
frequently than venture-backed IT firms to take a license at least in part for the
purpose of gaining access to knowledge. 61 More recent (but somewhat limited)
survey data suggests that across the range of industries an increasing number of
licensing demands, whether from practicing or nonpracticing entities, are ex post
rather than ex ante.62 Approaching the issues from the opposite direction, Colleen
Chien finds that the activities of patent trolls are disproportionately directed at
startup companies because such companies are more likely to pay nuisance
settlements than established companies with deeper pockets.63
The existing literature on patenting and entrepreneurship described above
yields two important conclusions. The first is that the relationship between the patent
system and entrepreneurial activity is complex and multifaceted. Patents influence
many aspects of startup behavior in many different ways. The second is that this
relationship is highly context-dependent; it depends on industry, firm structure, and
technology. But this literature ultimately raises more questions than it answers. It
offers little of the rich contextual detail needed to understand the complexity that it
suggests. In part this is likely due to methodological limitations. Survey data in
particular is useful in providing insights into trends and big-picture assessments, but
necessarily loses detail. This methodology also expressly takes the existing
arrangement of the patent system as a given. To the extent that policy prescriptions
follow from its conclusions, they tend to be focused on adjustments to the existing
system and ignore its alternatives.
57

FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 40 (2011).
58

Id. at 50.
See id. at 7–8.
60
See id. at 8–9.
61
See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1317–18.
62
See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 156–66 (2015).
63
See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 485–86
(2014).
59
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In the following Parts, this Article proposes a shift in the way that we conceive
of the relationship between intellectual property and entrepreneurship as both a
substantive and methodological matter.
III. FROM RESOURCE TO KNOWLEDGE TO ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS
In the following sections, I reconceptualize the relationship between
intellectual property and entrepreneurship as a kind of knowledge commons. In so
doing, I seek to shift the focus of analysis from startups’ reactions to the existing
patent system to startups’ behavior with respect to the information resources that
form critical parts of their businesses. This enables us to widen the lens and examine
intellectual property as one of a number of tools used to implement and sustain
certain functional relationships, rather than as an exogenously defined set of rules.
It also focuses attention on those relationships within communities rather than on
the actions of single firms. And it entails a shift in methodology toward case study
research.
The reconceptualization proceeds in three steps.
A. Resource Commons
In their pioneering work on commons-based resources, Elinor Ostrom and her
collaborators explained the persistence of self-governing institutions that could
manage natural resources in the absence of state-based property or regulatory
regimes. 64 Her examples of the management of “common pool resources” range
from Spanish irrigation districts, to the lobster gangs of Maine, to Japanese fisheries.
These (mostly) natural resources are of the type that we would ordinarily think
subject to the “tragedy of the commons.” 65 They are too large to facilitate
inexpensive exclusion, the resources are not subject to joint use, and improvement
efforts are shared among all users.66 Individuals acting rationally according to their
self-interest fail to exercise restraint in resource use, and the resource is depleted.67
Prior to Ostrom’s work, conventional wisdom held that there were only two
solutions to this problem: privatization through the assignment of property rights so
that the rightsholder would see the full costs and benefits of her management

64

See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 29–35; see also Yochai Benkler, Commons and
Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1499, 1508 (2013) (book review) (distinguishing between state-based and cooperative
“proprietary claims of exclusion, use, and disposition”).
65
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968); see
OSTROM, supra note 20, at 2–7 (describing the dynamic of resource overuse in a commons
as a “tragedy of the commons,” a “prisoner’s dilemma,” and a problem of “collective
action”).
66
See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 30–31.
67
See Hardin, supra note 65, at 1244–45.
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practices, on one hand;68 and government regulation to manage externalities, on the
other.69
Ostrom offered two seminal contributions. 70 First, she found that collective
action to manage common pool resources sustainably could and did in fact occur
without either privatization or government regulation.71 The key to facilitating such
collective action was the development of institutions—
sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make
decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what
aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what
information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.72
The Spanish huerta irrigation districts could be sustained because of a detailed
set of governance practices that were established and followed by the community
even in the absence of formal law.73 These practices are necessarily highly contextspecific. They are tailored to the particular local conditions, geographies, and
demographics. And they are facilitated through institutions that are intermediate
between private property and the state.74
This leads to Ostrom’s second contribution: a methodology for systematically
studying natural resource commons, drawing commonalities and differences among
them, and generalizing best and worst practices.75 Ostrom’s “institutional analysis
and development” framework structures a common set of research questions to
apply across diverse contexts so that information gleaned from individual case
studies can be aggregated.76
B. Knowledge Commons
In recent years, a number of scholars have demonstrated that Ostrom’s work
can be adapted to study the production of information-based goods.77 Instead of the
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tragedy of the commons, the problem to be overcome with respect to managing
information resources is that of underproduction: the nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable nature of information presents a disincentive to innovate because the
fruits of investment in research and development can be taken by others freely.78
And just as in the natural resources context, the conventional wisdom holds that this
underproduction problem must be remedied either through privatization—in the
form of intellectual property rights—or through government provision, like research
grants.79
Noting that “cultural production is an inherently social phenomenon, taking
place over a wide range of scales and within a complex, overlapping variety of
formal and informal institutional structures,” 80 Madison, Frischmann, and
Strandburg posit that there are institutional structures intermediate between
exclusive rights and government provision that allow for collective action to produce
intellectual goods even in the face of the economic challenges described above.81
Examples abound: patent pools, open-source software, Wikipedia, the Associated
Press, jamband fan communities, and others.82 Each of these communities utilizes a
set of institutional rules—sometimes intertwined with formal law, sometimes not—
to manage the production and dissemination of information.
To be sure, Ostrom’s framework for research into collective action to manage
natural resource communities does not map perfectly onto innovation environments.
This is particularly so because such environments involve not only management of
resources, but also the production of intellectual goods.83 Nevertheless, the analogy
remains a good one. Collective action problems in the natural environment may lead
to overuse of resources in the absence of a governance structure; so too in the cultural
or innovative environment may collective action problems lead to
underproduction.84 Barriers to collective action for the production of innovation can
be lowered through governance mechanisms.
To investigate systematically the nature of those governance structures,
Frischmann et al. set forth a series of questions to answer about the relevant
communities, actors, and activities. 85 Broadly speaking, they include questions
about: the background environment, such as the legal context and the “default” role
of intellectual property in respect of the resources to be produced; the various
attributes of the community, including the characteristics of the resource sought to
be produced and managed, the profiles of the relevant communities members and
their varying roles, and the goals and objectives of the commons and its members;
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the governance mechanisms, formal and informal, of the commons, including things
like institutional and technological architectures, legal structures, and decision rules;
and finally the patterns and outcomes of the commons including the benefits and
costs to various members.86
“Knowledge commons” is “shorthand for the institutionalized community
governance of the sharing of and, in some cases, creation of information, science,
knowledge, [or] data.” 87 And the questions above help to develop nuanced data
about the characteristics of knowledge commons.
C. The Entrepreneurial Commons
Entrepreneurial activity often has the characteristics of a knowledge commons.
Information production and management lies at the core of entrepreneurship. And
the information that drives value for entrepreneurs must often be shared with
others—development partners, funders, even competitors—in order for it to be
useful.
Most definitions of entrepreneurship require some element of novelty or
innovation. Modern scholars of entrepreneurship define it in terms of the creation
and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities, which in turn are novel or
innovative business ideas.88 Joseph Schumpeter, often regarded as the father of the
modern economics of entrepreneurship, defined five categories of entrepreneurial
activity, all of which emphasized novelty: new goods; new methods of production;
new geographical markets; new raw materials; and new ways of organizing.89 There
is some debate in the literature about whether entrepreneurship requires innovation
in the “strong sense” of new technologies that shake up established industries,90 or
the “weak sense” of finding new business opportunities.91 But regardless of the sense
in which “novelty” or “innovation” is used, it inevitably requires the generation of
new information. This is most obvious in the case of new products. As described
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above, the patent system has long been premised on the idea that the invention and
development of new products requires exclusive rights in the information that
underlies them.92 Indeed, any new product can be conceived as the embodiment of
the information required for its manufacture. 93 This is no less true of other
entrepreneurial opportunities. New methods of production are also a combination of
artifacts and information—the merger of capital equipment with processes and
procedures. New ways of organizing or new business models are solely informationbased. They require implementation through the use of organizational forms and
procedures, but the information required to carry them out often can be codified and
transmitted. New markets are similarly founded upon information about the market
opportunity; entry into a new market is valuable only so long as competitors remain
unaware of the market opportunity. Consistent with the patent system’s focus on
information, each of these entrepreneurial opportunities also has occasioned debate
about whether intellectual property protection would result in the generation of more
such opportunities.94
Entrepreneurship requires not only the creation of information, but also its
management. An idea for a new product may be a critical source of value, but it is
not likely to become a commercialized product without communication and
coordination among many parties. Information exchange is critical in at least three
distinct but overlapping functions of entrepreneurial firms: product development,
competitive strategy, and funding. In each of these functions, the successful
management of information is essential to success. And in each of these functions,
there is evidence that the role of intellectual property is ambiguous. It is only one of
many strategies that firms employ to manage the information at their disposal.
Of course, these three functions are iterative and overlap in complex ways. But
it is useful as an initial matter to be clear about how they work independently, and
then to investigate their interactions.
1. Product Development
It has become common to observe that there is a difference between “invention”
and “innovation,” between the conception of a new idea and its commercial
development.95 The two usually require different skill sets. Conceiving a new idea
or new product is different from developing a working prototype, scaling up
92
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production, market testing and marketing, distributing, and making follow-on
improvements.96 In order to access those skill sets, inventors need to communicate
their ideas to others. But doing so may be difficult or costly. For one thing, economic
theory predicts that there will be high transaction costs to information exchange,
mostly in the form of the “disclosure paradox” described above. 97 For another,
information often has characteristics that make it difficult to transfer—it may be
tacit, for example, and therefore difficult to codify and share.98
Entrepreneurial firms have a variety of strategies for overcoming these
problems. Some of them rely on intellectual property—patents can both solve the
disclosure paradox in some circumstances by making information excludable99 and
can facilitate information codification and exchange.100 Others do not. Entrepreneurs
in the biotech industry, for example, often rely upon the partial excludability of
knowledge required to implement certain research tools to allow development
partners and customers to gain sufficient knowledge to transact over the tools while
simultaneously protecting against misappropriation.101 In software, strong norms of
sharing emerge in some communities, sometimes backed up by IP- or contract-based
restrictions on that sharing. In short, a complex set of tools can be brought to
facilitate the exchange of knowledge required for product development.
It is worth noting two additional wrinkles to this problem. First, firms also face
and respond to information exchange problems internally. Even if a firm chooses
not to go outside its boundaries to access particular skill sets in product development,
it must still organize and manage information flows among its own employees.102
The relationships among the firm’s owners and managers and its employees with
respect to information are sometimes shaped by intellectual property,103 but more
often shaped by internal practices, background rules and norms, and various legal
rules governing trade secrets.104
Second, product development often is iterative. It can require not only the
transmission of information, but also the generation of new ideas and knowledge in
response to the needs of the development process. Collaboratively doing so presents
special governance challenges and requires innovative governance arrangements.
Gilson, Sabel and Scott call such arrangements “contracts for innovation,” in which
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the contracting parties agree to work together toward an underspecified goal, with
the idea of developing and applying new knowledge throughout the course of the
collaboration.105 The contracts they describe to implement these arrangements do
not set traditional terms like price and quantity, but rather specify the governance
mechanisms that will enable the parties to build trust and collaborate over time.106
2. Competitive Strategy
Entrepreneurial strategies, particularly in technology-based industries, are often
described as problems of appropriability. That is, how do firms appropriate the gains
from their investments in creating and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities?107
But the appropriability problem can also be cast as a problem of information
management. Entrepreneurial firms need to determine the extent to which their
competitive advantage derives from unique information and then to decide how to
manage that information in such a way as to maintain the competitive advantage.
There are at least two dimensions to this task. The first is figuring out how to
monetize the firm’s innovation; how to use the information to generate revenue?
Sometimes this is straightforward, as with sales of a new product; other times, it is
more complicated, as when, for example, a firm may choose to earn revenue through
licensing or to use a new process to gain an advantage in manufacturing an old
product. The second dimension concerns the firm’s position in the competitive
environment. The firm’s monetization strategy depends in no small part on the ease
with which competitors may enter and compete, on the industrial organization of the
relevant industry, and on the need to differentiate itself on the basis of any number
of factors.
All of these decisions turn in some part on the degree to which the firm’s core
information assets may be transferred—willingly or unwillingly—in the competitive
environment. Some information assets are self-revealing; once they are released into
the world, competitors can immediately glean the relevant information and begin
competition.108 The design of a paper clip, for example, can be gleaned simply from
observation. Others require more expensive reverse engineering (or may be
impossible to reverse engineer—the formula for Coca-Cola is the canonical
example).
Now return to the examples from the early and late telephone industry with
which this Article began. Bell’s telephone system was easily copied.109 The industry
in which he was competing was marked by a large monopolist in a position to
appropriate the technology and implement it (or suppress it) entirely on its own. In
105
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that context, Bell’s IP-based exclusion strategy made some sense. Vonage, by
contrast, operated in a vastly different competitive environment. IP-based telephony
protocols were not easily copied but were also poor fits for IP protection, because
they could be designed around. Putting aside the IP threats from incumbent carriers,
Vonage operated in a space in which network effects and first-mover advantages
rather than IP were the primary drivers of appropriability. IP here was a hindrance
rather than a help.
The point here is not to map all of the circumstances or factors that may bear
on firms’ competitive information management decisions. It is instead simply to
highlight the fact that such decisions are complex and context-specific.
3. Fundraising
Entrepreneurial startups need cash. Once they have exhausted friends and
family, personal credit cards, and other such readily available sources, they need to
access capital markets. And to do so, in turn, requires information exchange similar
to that described above. Indeed, in fundraising the challenge may be even greater.
On one hand, entrepreneurial firms need to communicate about their assets and
business plans with potential sources of capital. This raises the same disclosure
paradox problems as product development.110 But there is moral hazard on the other
side of the relationship as well, as venture capitalists must be sufficiently confident
ex ante that their portfolio companies will not simply take their money and run.
Robert Cooter refers to this as the “double trust dilemma.”111 Again, the mechanisms
that entrepreneurs and investors utilize to overcome this dilemma are varied and
context-specific. But they tend to focus on the effects of reputation. Venture
capitalists are repeat players in the market for startups, just as many entrepreneurs
themselves engage in serial business building.112
*

*

*

Of course, these three spheres of activity are not completely independent. They
overlap and interact in complex ways. The discussion to this point has focused on
functions rather than actors. But it is often the case that entrepreneurs, their
development partners, and their sources of financing engage in several of these
activities at the same time. Venture capitalists, for instance, often occupy seats on
the boards of directors of startups they invest in. In that capacity, they are responsible
not only for funding, but also for aspects of product development and strategic
planning. Entrepreneurs similarly wear multiple hats. And there are often other
110
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actors involved in entrepreneurial ventures—universities, for example. Together,
these actors playing multiple roles make up entrepreneurial communities capable of
at least rough definition. Indeed, entrepreneurial communities are often
characterized by the presence of networks of individuals all engaged in various
forms of information sharing.113 And these networks are often localized in particular
geographies. Silicon Valley and Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, are wellknown “innovation clusters.”114 In such clusters, industry, government, academia,
and finance co-locate in ways that facilitate communication and collaboration. These
environments tend to be rich in entrepreneurial activity and are often referred to as
“ecosystems.”115
That parallelism with the original source of institutional commons research is
telling. Entrepreneurial activity, as described above, is in many ways similar to the
management of a natural resource commons. Entrepreneurial communities engage
in the production and management of new information and knowledge. Indeed, that
is at the core of entrepreneurial activity. And they do so through varied and contextspecific institutional mechanisms that include, but are not limited to intellectual
property. The relationship between IP and entrepreneurship is therefore much
different from the way in which it has traditionally been portrayed in the legal
literature on innovation.
At this point, it is worth pausing to address a couple of related objections to
characterizing entrepreneurial activity as a commons. The first is rhetorical. It may
seem incongruous at best to describe entrepreneurial ventures in the same breath as,
say, Wikipedia. 116 And if entrepreneurship can be modeled as an instance of
commons governance, cannot the same thing be said of big corporations? Is Pfizer
a commons?117 The second is practical: how much room is there for commons-style
sharing in a profit-making enterprise? Because profit emerges only from private
goods that are rivalrous and excludable, how can profit-seeking entities sustainably
support commons governance?
Both objections can be answered by recognizing that a “commons” “does not
denote the resources, the community, a place, or a thing.” 118 It is instead “the
institutional arrangement of those elements” to create a “form of community
management or governance.”119 It is a set of institutionalized mechanisms for the
production and management of a particular resource—in this case, information. The
113
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governance of that resource is conceptually separable from the goals of the
participants. Commons governance is, in other words, a means rather than an end.
And commons-based information management is consistent with a wide variety of
ends, including profit-making ends. Consider, for example, that the open-source
software community—long the poster child for commons-based production 120 —
includes profit-making entities like Red Hat, a provider of services for users of opensource software, that have built successful business models around sustainable
commons management. Or consider the many user-innovation communities that
exchange information in the course of amateur pursuits but eventually spawn profitmaking entrepreneurial entities to implement at a larger scale many of the user
innovations generated by the commons.121
IV. CONCLUSION: STUDYING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS
Reconceptualizing entrepreneurial activity as a knowledge commons leads us
to ask a different set of questions than previous studies have, and to utilize a different
set of methodological tools. As Part II described, existing approaches to
understanding the relationship between IP and entrepreneurship focus on the firm
and its reactions to various IP laws. By contrast, to the extent that the exemplar
entrepreneurial activities described in Part III can be described as instances of
commons governance, the analysis must necessarily be broader. The knowledge
commons framework forces us to acknowledge that much of information production
and dissemination depends on relationships among individuals and their interactions
with the background competitive environment and the legal and market factors that
shape it.
Frischmann and his collaborators articulate a standard set of questions for
investigating knowledge commons that should prove readily adaptable to the study
of the entrepreneurial commons. They ask about:122
• The background environment—the legal and cultural context in which
the activity exists; and the “default” IP status of the relevant resources.
Here, the evidence so far suggests much variation. The “default” IP status
of any given information resource, for example, tends to be industryspecific.123 The background legal and cultural context tends to vary with
geography.124
• The attributes of the resources at issue, the community members, and
the goals and objectives of the various parties. Here, the analysis will focus
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on the business. What is the technology? Who is involved? What are their
goals and objectives? The traditional analysis of IP and entrepreneurship
elides much of this detail. It assumes a single company and asks how that
company responds to externally set rules. The knowledge commons
framework instead broadens the analysis to include a wider variety of
actors who influence the course of entrepreneurial activity. This in turn
enables more fine-grained analysis of the mechanisms of information
management.
• The governance of the commons—the spheres of activity and the
formal and informal rules, norms, and decision makers that govern that
activity; and finally about the patterns and outcomes of the activity.125 This
set of questions focuses on the interactions among diverse community
members outlined above. It focuses on how information actually is
produced and managed without biasing the analysis in the first instance
through a focus on intellectual property. IP may well be important in many
settings; in others it may be of little importance; and, more likely, it plays
a nuanced role alongside other rules, norms, and decisions.
• Patterns and outcomes—what benefits are delivered to participants;
what are the costs and risks associated with commons management?
Methodologically, these questions are best answered in the context of a case
study. Ostrom’s and Frischmann’s groups rely primarily on qualitative,
ethnographic studies of particular communities. That methodology allows for deep
exploration of the questions posed above. In particular, case studies will help to
surface the multiple strategies that entrepreneurial firms utilize to manage
information sharing—including those that utilize IP in various ways, and those that
do not. Although it is of course difficult to generalize from any single case study,
the accumulation of such studies can lead to generalizable results.
Framing the relationship between intellectual property and entrepreneurship in
the terms described above leads both to a positive and normative research agenda.
As a descriptive matter, there is much to be gained from systematically studying
these questions in a variety of different contexts. Indeed, a fuller picture of the
relationship requires numerous case studies of different firms and different
industries. From this descriptive knowledge base, normative conclusions about
changes to our intellectual property laws and rules that would benefit entrepreneurs
can more readily and justifiably be drawn.
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